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their beginnings in the works of Simmel and Weber -  at least so 
far as the history of the response to them is concerned. The North 
American response by Albion W. Small and Robert E. Park on the 
one hand and Talcott  Parsons on the other has tended more to 
amplify than to dampen this dissociation (Levine,  1971: xlviiiff.; 
Faught,  1985: 156ff.). 
On the one hand, it seems as if Simmel's microscopic analyses of 
the everyday social interactions and modes of cultural experience 
in modern  life confront  Weber's  sociological categories and his 
universal-historical investigation as if they were a different world. 
The two seem to drift even  further apart through  the  contrast 
between  Simmel's  preference  for  an  aesthetically  rich  literary 
expression and Weber's insistence on a 'clear' formation of concepts 
devoid of any stylistic attraction. On the other other hand, a number 
of substantive similarities in the works of the two great thinkers and 
founders of modern sociology had  already been  discussed at an 
early stage in the secondary literature, which ultimately made the 
questions as to their specific epistemological and methodological 
positions increasingly acute. 
In particular,  there appears to have been  unanimity for many 
decades  that  Simmel's  Philosophy  of  Money  (Philosophie  des 
Geldes) (1922) must  be  accorded an exceptional significance for 
Weber's  theory of occidental rationalism and the corresponding 
studies in cultural  history and the sociology of  religion.  This is 
an assessment, by  the way,  which  found  fertile soil in  Weber's 
professed Support for the tradition of scholarly cultural analysis 
as inaugurated  by  Simmel's  Philosophy of  Money  (cf.  Weber, 
1920: 34;  Frischeisen-Köhler,  1919/20: 18;  Lukacs,  1958: 175; 
Mannheim, 1980: 313; Salomon, 1945: 606; Tenbruck, 1959: 622ff.; 
Frisby,  1978: 22ff.;  Faught,  1985;  Pohimann,  1987;  Lichtblau, 
1988: 33ff.).  It is also a consensus that the commonalities in such 
analyses stem  in  Part  from  a  radical  renunciation  of  the  naive 
optimism on Progress as expressed in the Enlightenment philosophy 
of the eighteenth century and in the industrial boom of the late 
nineteenth century in Germany (the Gründerzeit).  In that sense they 
prepared  the  way  for  a  tragic  consciousness  within  German 
sociology (Lenk, 1964; Dahme,  1918; Liebersohn, 1988). There is 
an equivalent consensus in the history of dogma about moving the 
origin of  Western Marxism  and central motifs of the Frankfurt 
School  back  to the unconventional  Simmel-Weber  synthesis as 
marked out in the work of the young Georg Lukacs (cf. Schnabel, 
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1974: 1  lOff.; Frisby, 1978: 22ff.;  Beiersdorfer, 1986; Turner, 1986; 
Dannemann,  1987: 61ff., 83ff.; Scaff,  1987, 1989). 
In  that  respect  it  is  no coincidence that,  particularly  among 
theoreticians of  cultural  modernity  who  feel themselves obliged 
to this  traditional  context  and the knowledge  claims expressed 
in  it, the work  of  Simmel and Weber is coming to occupy the 
centre of  attention in  a  comparative perspective  as Part  of  the 
clarification of the fundamental conceptual premises for a socio- 
logically  significant  cultural  analysis  of  European  rnodernity 
(cf. Scaff,  1987, 1989; Whimster,  1987: 268ff.;  Frisby,  1988a, b; 
Lichtblau, 1988, 1989/90).  Both Simmel's theory of the divergent 
development of  'subjective'  and 'objective'  culture,  and Weber's 
analysis of  the objectification  and generalization of  relations of 
domination that were originally genuinely personal have come into 
view as pre-formulations of Lukacs's  critique of the reification of 
consciousness  in  bourgeois  society.  Simmel's  theory  is  likewise 
viewed as the possibility of an irrational questioning of the culture 
of modernity which is due to the 'life process' itself, or better, the 
emergence of new charismatic personalities and social revolutionary 
movements. This has finally turned even the question of the status 
of the respective individual freedom and of the concrete margins of 
action  for  the individual within this  'autonomization'  of  'social 
forms' into an 'iron cage' of lifestyle and the routinization of action 
in the wake of the 'mechanisms of rationalization' (Davis, 1973: 322; 
Kalberg,  1978: Iff .; Bevers, 1985: 140; Lichtblau,  1988: 87ff.). 
This  multiplicity  of  substantive  relations  between  Simmel's 
and Weber's  works is the actual reason why  even their differing 
views of  the nature and characteristics of sociology as an 'exact' 
and academically conducted specialized discipline have found an 
increased international audience and correspondingly more atten- 
tion during the past few years. For some time, there have existed 
attempts to determine from a comparative perspective sociology's 
relationship with respect to the efforts at its institutionalization as 
a specialized academic discipline (Dahme and Rammstedt,  1984; 
Rammstedt, 1985; Weiss, 1988), and to eiplicate  its handling of the 
problem of the semantic ambiguity of contexts of meaning and a 
corresponding aesthetic-literary form of representing them (Green, 
1988; Levine, 1988). By  now, there are also a considerable number 
of studies which claim to bring a bit more light into the tangled rela- 
tionship between Simmel's conception of apure or  formalsociology 
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Two  differing evaluations can  be  observed,  which  dominate 
these methodological discussions and at the Same time clarify the 
aporia of such a comparison of theories.  The first case draws on 
Simmel's  epistemological investigation on  The Problems  of  the 
Philosophy of  History (Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie) 
from the year  1892, which  appeared in  1905 in a heavily revised 
second edition. Here the conception of a science of  reality (Wirk- 
lichkeitswissenschaft), i.e. the theory of  interpretation and of ideal- 
typical concept formation  that had already begun to be developed 
by  Simmel, is considered  the model and the heuristic frame of 
reference  for  Weber's  own  methodological  works  (Tenbruck, 
1958: 604ff., 1959: 622ff; Levine, 1971: xlv, 1984: 326ff.; Schnabel, 
1974: 104ff.; Bevers,  1985: 125ff.;  Segre,  1987; Lichtblau,  1988: 
20ff.). In the second approach, it is simultaneously  pointed out that 
this epistemological investigation into the a priori presuppbsitions 
of history, which  would  become so important  to Weber's  work, 
does not in fact contain a methodological foundation of Simmel's 
own sociology. In that respect, his 'pure' or 'formal' sociology ought 
not be hastily equated to Weber's  programme of an 'interpretive' 
sociology,  since  the  two  are  based  in  Part  on  completely dif- 
ferent foundations and also pursue differing knowledge interests 
(Tenbruck,  1958: 604ff.,  1959: 622ff.;  Atoji,  1982: 5ff.;  Bevers, 
1985: 125ff.; Nedelmann,  1988). 
The state of the debate in  this area becomes totally confused 
if one additionally introduces the peculiar status of Simmel's Philo- 
sophy of  Money into this tissue of relationships. That work was of 
no less importance than The Problems of  the Philosophy ofHistory 
for Weber's  self-clarification and intellectual development at the 
time of his recovery, yet by Simmel's own admission it is neither a 
socioeconomic study in the specialized sense nor does it even contain 
an application of his 'sociology' (cf. Lichtblau, 1986). Furthermore, 
Weber's infrequent remarks on Simmel's sociological method in the 
narrow sense remain oddly enigmatic, and should probably be held 
responsible in  Part  for  the current  confusion in  relation to the 
significance of Simmel's work for Weber's plan of an 'interpretive' 
sociology. Indeed, it can be surmised that Weber's inadequate under- 
standing relative to the particular characteristics of Simmel's  dif- 
ferent works and their corresponding methodological approaches 
can be traced back to an initial insecurity on Weber's  part  with 
respect to his own sociological self-understanding, which also left 
its mark on his contradictory judgements of Simmel's  work. 
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Symptomatic of  Weber's  irritation  and lack of  understanding 
with  respect  to  the  cognitive  status  and  the  methodological 
* 
peculiarity  of  Simmel's  work  is  the  fact  that  Weber  did  not 
distinguish at all between the various types of texts among Simmel's 
works and their disciplinary classifications. Instead,  he refers to 
them in a quite undifferentiated way, and incidentally, very selec- 
tively in the context of his attempts to clarify the 'logical' problems 
of  the  'human  sciences'  (Geisteswissenschaften)  or  'historical 
cultural sciences' (historische  Kulturwissenschaften). These 'logicai' 
problems of historical cultural sciences are discussed in Simmel's 
works only in the various editions of his Problems of  the Philosophy 
of  History,  as well  as in his later works,  The Problem  of  His- 
torical Time (Das Problem der historischen Zeit) (1916), 'Historicai 
Formation' (Die historische Formung) (1917/1918), and in On the 
Nature of  Historical Understanding (Vom Wesen des historischen 
Verstehens) (1918b).  There was no such discussion in  The Philo- 
sophy of  Money and Simmel's various sociological writings, whose 
specific cognitive status was not perceived by Weber at all. 
By contrast to Weber himself, Simmel had developed at an early 
date, at the latest by  the publication of On Social Differentiation 
(Über sociale Differenzierung) (1890), a clear and precise concep- 
tion of  sociology as a specifically new  discipline which  was  cer- 
tainly limited in its knowledge claims. Specifically, he conceived of 
it as 'pure'  or 'formal'  science, that  is to say a  specific method 
of  research,  which  Stands in a relation of  form to content with 
respect  to  the  other  human  and  social  sciences  (Geistes-  und 
Sozialwissenschaften),  or 'cultural studies' (Kulturwissenschaften) 
(Simmel,  1890: 1-20;  cf.  Rammstedt,  1988). The only important 
enhancement of this programme of a formal sociology developed 
in  the last decade of  the preceding century is  represented by the 
'Digression  on  the  Problem:  How  is  Society  Possible?'  in  the 
introductory chapter  of  his 'large'  sociology from  1908. There, 
Simmel underscored the a priori character of the 'pure'  forms of 
sociation over against the 'empirical'  aspects of the 'contents' enter- 
ing into these forms of  sociation, i.e.  the motives,  needs,  ends 
and  inner  'experiences'  of  the  specific individuals (cf.  Simmel, 
1968: 21-30). 
On the other hand, Simmel's  1917 study of  The Fundamental 
Ouestions of Sociology (Die Grundfragen der Soziologie) (1970),  a---- 
known  as ihe 'little9-~ociolo~~,  contains  no  further categoricai 
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fully and finally formulated in 1908. Rather, it offers only a refine- 
ment of this 'pure'  or 'formal' sociology for pedagogical purposes 
with respect to the epistemology of the sociai sciences on the one 
hand,  and social philosophy  or 'philosophical sociology' on the 
other (Simmel, 1970: 5-32;  cf. Dahme, 1981: 248ff.,  1984). At the 
time Weber was increasingly turning to sociological research and 
the problems of its methodological foundation,  Simmel had  in 
essence already abandoned  this terrain  for newer areas of work 
which  seemed more personally important to him  (cf.  Troeltsch, 
1922: 572ff.; Tenbruck, 1958: 593). This state of affairs documents 
the fact that Weber was not a contemporary of Simmel's at all, but 
in a sense already belonged to a new generation. 
Unlike Simmel, Weber had not entered the scene with intentions 
from the beginning to found a sociology operating as a specialized 
discipline to form an alternative to the older and newer traditions 
of a speculative and metaphysical 'social theory'.  In the controver- 
sies  that  had  erupted  in  the  'methodological  quarrel'  between 
Schmoller and Menger in economics, as well  as in the historiansi 
quarrels over Kar1 Lamprecht's  works on cultural history, regard- 
ing the relationship between a genuinely historical and a purely 
systematic knowledge  or  between  an  'individual  psychological' 
and a 'social  psychological' method of  knowledge, Weber's  own 
attempts  to  reach  a  new  and  independent  solution  to  these 
unresolved  problems  have  the  character  of  occasional  pieces, 
whose programmatic claims had not from the beginning intended 
something like a sociology operating as an autonomous science. 
Even the posthumously published 'Theory of  Sociological Cate- 
gories'  in  Economy  and  Society  (1968)  was,  by  Weber's  own 
self-understanding,  purely  a  conceptual  aid  for  his  historical- 
comparative investigations of universal history, and was only later 
hypostatized by  his later disciples into an end in itself (cf. Weber, 
1972b: 1-180;  Tenbruck, 1959; Hennis,  1987; Weiss,  1989: 7-19). 
This may finally have been one of the reasons why Weber said so 
little about  Simmel's  actual sociological writings  and was  more 
interested in Simmel the 'logician'  and 'cultural philosopher'. 
In the following section, I will sharpen these 'ambivalent encoun- 
ters' between Simmel and Weber in terms of the question of what 
significance for Weber's  attempts at clarification of  the 'logical 
problems'  of  the  'historical  cultural  sciences'  in  general can  be 
ascribed to Simmel's  works in the methodological sense. To this 
end,  the  various  references  of  Weber  to  Simmel's  work  and 
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especially his critique of Simmel will be considered. Additionally, 
the inappropriateness of Weber's  critique of Simmel will be dis- 
cussed  against the background  of  Simmel's  own work,  in order 
to clarify the question of the relationship Simmel's  project  of a 
'pure'  or  'formal'  sociology  has  to  Max  Weber's  'interpretive' 
sociology. 
I1 
Simmel never  directly referred  to Weber's  work  in  publications 
that  appeared during his  life or posthumously.  Besides his con- 
sistent  practice  of  avoiding  quotations,  caused  in  Part  by  his 
aesthetic 'attitude',  the previously mentioned temporal gap between 
the sociological creative periods of the two authors may have also 
motivated this. 
Weber, by  contrast, refers directly and indirectly to Simmel in 
the various essays in his Wissenschaftslehre, in his writings on the 
sociology of  religion, at the beginning of  his Basic  Concepts of 
Sociology  (Soziologische  Grundbegriffe)  and  in  Economy  and 
Society. Around 1908, he also began working out a critical reaction 
to Simmel's Soziologie, as announced in his essay on Knies, but, like 
so many of Weber's  later projects, this remained a fragment, first 
published in 1972, in an English translation (Weber, 1972a). On the 
basis of  Weber's  own voluminous methodological discussions of 
the 'logical prooems'  of  'historical cultural sciences', and taking 
into account these different Statements in Weber's  writings directly 
related to Simmel's work, the following will strive to reconstruct the 
central critical points which Weber felt it necessary to assert against 
Simmel's  sociological self-understanding and scientific method in 
general. It will be seen in the process that Weber attempted to com- 
prehend Simmel's work with a standard that was not only wholly 
inappropriate to it, but also sheds some light on Weber's own theory 
and practice of 'interpreting'. 
Let it be emphasized first that Weber attempted to define both 
Simmel's Philosophy of Money and his Problems of the Philosophy 
of History as well  as his actual sociological writings with regard 
to their contributions to the project of  an 'interpretive sociology' 
in the sense that Weber later pursued. Additionally, it is striking 
in  this  sense  that  Weber  generally positively  assessed Simmel's 
reconstruction of the epistemological problems of historiography 
and the theory of  'historical interpretation'  he had  sketched out 
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treated the Philosophy of Money as well as Simmel's Soziologie with 
critical distance or even rejection, because of their epistemological 
premises, which  he considered problematic.  He nevertheless felt 
ambivalent in this connection, because it was precisely the latter 
two  'main  sociological  works'  of  Simmel's  to which  he  mwed 
so many Stimuli in the substantive sense.  Let  us  therefore  turn 
first to Weber's  positive references to Simmel's  writings,  before 
submitting his  critique of  Simmel's  'sociological  method'  in  the 
The Philosophy of Money and his actual Soziologie to a detailed 
discussion. 
Quite early,  Weber  credited Simmel with  the achievement of 
having worked out 'by  far the most logically developed approaches 
to a theory of "interpretation" ', especially in the second edition of 
his Problems of the Philosophy of History (Weber, 1985: 92). In 
particular  it  is  the rigid  distinction between the nomological  or 
nomothetic and ideographic or historical sciences (Gesetzes- und 
Wirklichkeitswissenschaft) which Weber draws from the works of 
Simmel, Windelband and Rickert, in order to underscore the dis- 
tinctive character of the concept formation in the cultural sciences 
vis-A-vis  the  'realistic'  or 'naturalistic'  self-misunderstandings of 
the historians and economists of his period (Weber, 1985; 4,  146, 
1- 
Rickert, Weber justifies the emphasis on the purely hypothetical 
character of the scientific 'interpretation'  of historical and socio- 
economic processes with  the argument that 'reality'  as such con- 
stitutes an 'intensive infinity of all the empirically existing variety'. 
This necessarily forces the researcher into a rigid 'material selec- 
tion',  in order to distil a conceived order out of  this 'heteroge- 
neous continuum'  of  events, or to make it  'comprehensible'  by 
relating it to an 'adequately' conceived and 'causally relevant' nexus 
' 
of meaning (Weber,  1985: 75,  114). Similarly to Simmel, Weber 
emphasizes  a  Iower  threshold  of  historical  interpretation, the 
criterion of which  Simmel designates as the respective degree of 
consequence of a historical event, and Weber as its causally relevant 
aspect (Simmel, 1905: 131,1957: 57; Weber, 1985: 233). Weber also 
refers positively to Simmel's emphasis on the individual character 
of 'mass  phenomena',  to the extent they can be reconstructed by 
the 'method  of interpretation',  as well as to Simmel's view of the 
necessity of specific value relationships that guide the researcher 
in the choice of material and the hypothetical construction of its 
meanings. 
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Along with Simmel, Weber advances the view that it is not only 
strongly characterized historical personalities and the motives of 
their actions that can be best interpreted, but also that a strongly 
marked personality of the historian himself is the best presupposi- 
tion  for  the  interpretation  of  individual  Courses  of  action  by 
great historical individuals, as  well  as for grasping the meaning 
of  apparently  fortuitous events and mass phenomena  (Simmel, 
1905: 52ff.;  Weber,  1985:48,  101,  548).  And  just  as  much  as 
Simmel, Weber views the manifestation of social conflict or struggle 
as an  essential  component  of  sociation  processes,  which  finds 
expression  on the  methodological level  in  the  recognition of  a 
pluralism or 'absolute  polytheism'.  Weber, however, Sees the pre- 
conditions for a 'mortal struggle, as if between God and the Devil' 
in this pluralism of the various cultural 'value spheres' or 'possible 
points  of  view'.  Simmel,  on  the  other  hand,  relativizes  that 
pluralism to the logical parallelism of possible value spheres or the 
more moderate form of a respective 'personal attitude',  by which 
means the individual personality expresses its specific  views towards 
the  'world'  surrounding  it  (Weber,  1985: 463,  507;  cf.  Simmel, 
1910: 23ff.,  1918a: 30ff.).  Finally, like Simmel, Weber considers 
the  description  of  'rational  progress',  or the various  processes  .  ..  *fA-bnn  nf  -nAmrn 
occidental culture, to be a major task of sociology and of a cor- 
responding  cultural  theory  (Weber,  1985: 525ff .;  cf.  Simmel, 
1892: 40ff.;  Weber,  1968: 147ff.). 
Weber takes a critical if not hostile view of the thesis advanced 
by Simmel and Karl Lamprecht that this process of the increasing 
prevalence of the model of instrumentally rational  action in the 
most  varied  areas  of  society,  interpreted  as  rational progress 
and social  differentiation, must  necessarily be  accompanied by 
an  increasing  differentiation  of  the  subjective culture  of  inner 
'experience'.'  In this connection, with a glance at Karl Lamprecht's 
writing on cultural  history,  Weber  criticizes the existence of  an 
'allegedly  determinate  and  uniform  succession  of  the  various 
"impressionisms" in the social psyche'.  He also asserts the objec- 
tion to Simmel's 'impressionism' that the increasing significance of 
'emotional nuances' need not necessarily contain at the Same time 
an increasing differentiation in the forms of 'experience' itself. The 
'race  for sensations' and 'the  intellectually interesting' which  are 
characteristic  of  modern  culture  should,  in  Weber's  view,  be 
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everyday life inwardly' and of a spreading 'aesthetic twilight mood' 
in the frn de siscle (Weber,  1985: 7f.,  518f.;  for a  discussion of 
Simmel's 'impressionism' See Frisby, 198  1 ;  Böhringer, 1989). Weber 
does partially concur with regard to the view that there is aprogres- 
sivesocial differentiation  and  rationalization, to  the extent it is con- 
nected with the idea of an increase in rational social organization. 
Before naively transferring a Pattern of differentiation  borrowed 
from biology to sociocultural processes,  however, he insists on a 
clarification of the question: 
how  in  the early Stages of human social differentiation the  realm  of purely 
mechanical-instinctive  differentiation should be assessed in relationship to that 
which is individually and sensually comprehensible and further to that which is 
consciously and rationally created. (Weber,  1985: 461, 473, 5761.) 
This reservation, implicitly also directed against Simmel's theory 
of social differentiation, can also be sharpened into the methodo- 
logical question of what is the relationship in Simmel's Soziologie 
between  the subjectively intended meaning  and  that  objectively  - 
valid meaning which 'interpretive sociology' attempts to reconstruct 
in the form of an empirical checking of the researcher's adequacy 
of  meaning by the causal relevancy of his interpretations. Of course, 
Weber  himself  admits that Simmel's  book  on The Problems of 
the Philosophy of  History deserves the merit  of  having  'clearly 
separated the objective "interpretation" of the meaning of a state- 
ment  from  the subjective "interpretation"  of  the  motives  of  a 
(speaking or acting) person'. On the other hand, he later repeatedly 
accuses Simmel of causing the intended and the objectively valid 
meaning  to 'blur  deliberately',  especially  in  The Philosophy  of 
Money and Soziologie, whereas Weber would 'sharply distinguish 
them'  (cf. Weber, 1985: 427,  541). 
The apparent contradiction between Weber's first statement from 
the year 1905 and his later judgement  from the years 1913-20 can 
be resolved in the following sense. Simmel was concerned  in the 
quoted Passage from The Problems of  the Philosophy of  History 
only with the distinction between the interpretation of a sentence's 
meaning independently of the context in which it was first uttered 
and the interpretation of the intentions of the speaking and acting 
persons. In the second case, however, Weber accuses Simmel of not 
having sufficiently distinguished within his 'sociological method', in 
the narrower sense, between the interpretation of the motives of the 
social actors and the objective context of  meaning reconstructed by 
the researchers,  in which a  statement or an action appears both 
'adequate  to the  meaning'  and  'causally  relevant'  (cf.  Levine, 
1984: 328-34;  Nedelmann,  1988: 13ff.). 
This  central  objection  that  Weber  raises  against  Simmel's 
'method' can be supplemented and expanded by a series of further 
critical  points,  which  Weber  lodged  against  The Philosophy of 
Money and his Soziologie and which are directly connected to this 
main argument of Weber's.  Weber additionally not only accuses 
Simmel  of  treating  actual  problems  of  being  (Seinsprobleme) 
as problems o  f meaning (Sinnprobleme),  that is, ultimately meta- 
physically, but also of drawing illustrations and analogies for 'inter- 
preting' sociologically relevant facts from the most diverse spheres 
of meaning. To be Sure, Weber also recognizes the heuristic value 
of uncovering 'parallelisms' between the most various 'causal series' 
and 'contexts of meaning' in the sense of the construction of 'com- 
prehensible images' of events. Unlike Simmel, however, he views the 
'comparison of "analogous" events' as only one of several means of 
'attribution' and therefore merely a 'preliminary Stage' of the actual 
work  of  an 'interpretive  sociology' -  that  is,  the formation  of 
'sharp concepts' and 'pure types' of 'causal relevance'.  By  contrast, 
he  claims  that  for  Simmel  the  'analogous'  side  of  a  concrete 
phenomenon  that  is being cited  is elevated  to its 'actual  nature' 
and therefore ultimately  abstracted from its causal conditionality 
(Weber,  1972a: 160ff.,  1985: 14, 26ff.,  124, 232;  on the positive 
evaluation  of  Simmel's  'brilliant  images'  in  The Philosophy  of 
Money See  Weber,  1920: 34). 
In reproaching Simmel's investigation of cultural philosophy and 
sociology for its causal irrelevance, Weber is attempting at the Same 
time to  strike at the heart of Simmel's 'sociological method'. Already 
in  1905, Weber had pointed to the problematics of the 'remarks 
on the concept  of  society  and the duties of  sociology  scattered 
throughout his [Simmel's] various writings', and in that connection 
had quoted for the first time the corresponding critique of Simmel's 
positions by Othmar Spann (Weber, 1985: 93). In his fragmentary 
manuscript on 'Georg Simmel as Socioiogist and Theoretician of the 
Money Economy' from 1908 (English trans. 1972a)' Weber renews 
this appeal to Spann's  critique of  Simmel, seconding it 'in  many 
essential points',  although Spann had not been able to take account 
of Simmel's 'large'  Soziologie of 1908, which Weber credited with 
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to Simmel's  earlier  stances that  had  been  criticized  by  Spann'. 
Additionally, Weber launches an attack of his own on the central 
and  fundamental concept  in  Simmel's  'method',  which  Spann 
had  already  scrutinized  critically:  the  principle  of  interaction 
(Wechselwirkung)  which  Simmel  conceived  of  as  the  'global 
regulative principle' (cf. Simmel, 1890: 13ff.; Weber, 1972a: 162f.; 
Spann, 1905, 1907: 178ff.). 
Weber,  of Course,  recognizes that  for  Simmel sociology is  a 
science concerned with the interactions between individuals. None- 
theless, this concept of 'interaction' appears deeply 'ambigubus' to 
him,  since a  'relationship  that  is not  somehow mutual . . . [is] 
scarcely constructible within physical reality in the most literal sense 
and as a general phenomenon'. Therefore, Weber reaches a conclu- 
sion he considers devastating for Simmel's sociology, that this idea 
is so abstract in its concept and broad in its contents 'that it would 
require the greatest artificiality to conceive of an influence of one 
Person by another that would be purely "one-sided",  i.e. not con- 
taining a certain element of "interaction'"  (Weber, 1972a: 163).' 
The thrust of Weber's argument becomes even clearer when we 
include the criticisms raised by  Othmar Spann against Simmel's 
'formal' sociology, objections to which Weber referred approvingly 
several  time^.^ Spann had anticipated at a very early date a central 
problem of Simmel's 'speculative atomism',  to which Simmel did 
not provide a satisfactory answer until 1908 -  the question that 
remained to be cleared up: 'How  is social science as a science of 
complexes,  whose  elements  are  already  subject  to  universal 
research, possible at all?' Spann considered Simmel's  'solution of 
this preliminary epistemological question' by means of the 'global 
regulative principle' of interaction 'unsatisfactory in its implementa- 
tion and contradictory and metaphysical in its construction' (Spann, 
1905: 310;  for a discussion of Simmel's  'speculative atomism' See 
also Böhringer, 1976). Spann criticizes Simmel's view that in princi- 
ple there can be 'laws  of events' only for the smallest Part of the 
physical  world.  He  argues  that  in  the context  of  such  episte- 
mological premises it can no longer be plausibly shown in what form 
an 'independent law' could then be formulated for the 'complex as 
such' and the 'totality' of social phenomena. The 'sublimation of the 
concept of society' to a mere name for the sum of  all social interac- 
tions is therefore said to be a necessary consequence of Simmel's 
'formal'  sociology, which makes social science 'impossible'  as an 
independent science. 
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In opposition to that, Spann insists on the uniform, not purely 
gradual effect of social formations, which are likewise also accessi- 
ble in principle 10 a law-based causal analysis. In that respect, he 
views  even  Simmel's  concept  of  interaction  as only  the special 
, 
case of  a double causal relationship, in the sense of a 'mutual rela- 
tionship  of  dependency between  two  quantities',  whose  'exact 
causal-theoretical determination and justification' is a desideratum 
in  Simmel's  sociology.  The Same applies to the  formulation of 
a  'material  concept  of  society'  because of  Simmel's  excessively 
abstract and unsubstantively formulated principle of interaction. 
Spann concludes his critique of the inadequacy of Simmel's episte- 
mological foundation of the social sciences with the postulate that 
it remains to be shown how the individual interactions and com- 
plexes of phenomena can be constituted as specifically social at all, 
with  respect  to the  premises  advocated  by  Simmel (cf.  Spann, 
1905: 3 10-35,  1907: 189-220,  1923b: 25-46). 
In what  follows I demonstrate that these objections raised by 
Weber  and  Spann against Simmel's  'method'  only represent his 
starting-points for an epistemological foundation of the modern 
social sciences in  a completely inadequate way, and largely miss 
their mark.  I will  show that Simmel solved the criticisms raised 
against his methodological approach by means of a logically consis- 
tent theory of  interpretive understanding (Verstehen), both in the 
second edition (Simmel, 1905, 1977) of his study of  The Problems 
of  the Philosophy of  History as well  as in his 'Digression on the 
Question:  How  is  Society Possible?'  from  1908 (Simmel,  1959, 
1968). And he did this in eway that not only proves Weber's and 
Spann's criticism of  him obsolete, but is also more capable than 
Weber's  own  approaches of  satisfying the demands that  we  are 
compelled by the current state of knowledge to place on the founda- 
tion of 'interpretive sociology'.  Finally, I will clarify the specific 
knowledge interests Simmel pursued with his carefully measured 
out and well reflected trisection of 'cultural sciences' (Kulturwissen- 
schafteri) into an epistemology of  the historical and social sciences 
and the respective underlying empiricalscientific correlatives on the 
one hand, and the theory of  cultural modernity explicated in his The 
Philosophy of  Money on the other. 
III 
In  order  to illustrate  the  difference  between  the  basic  episte- 
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look at the history of the concepts of causality and interaction which 
they employ as 'global regulative principles'.  It must first be stressed 
that  Weber's  insistence on the  inescapable necessity  of  causal 
anaiyses in the area of the 'historical  cultural sciences' no longer 
possessed any direct persuasive power as such at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Following the revolutionizing of the world 
view of  naturalscience around the turn of the century, the suitability 
of the causal category for the fundamental conceptual reconstruc- 
tion of physical processes had been cailed into question. The crisis 
of the mechanical world view is owing in Part to the insight from 
the physics of elementary particles as developed by Max Planck and 
Albert Einstein that the interactions between 'elementary quantities' 
or quanta on one hand, and 'matter' on the other, cannot be recon- 
structed along the Pattern of cause and effect. Rather, all that can 
still be described are the constant relationships of changes in time 
in the sense of a fundamental relativity, that is, a 'dependence of 
phenomena on one another'  (Ernst Mach). By  completely cutting 
through t he relationship between causality and adherence to laws, 
which  was  still constitutive for classical mechanics, Weber does 
react to the foundational crisis of the modern scientific world view. 
At the Same time, however, he dissolves the concept of causality into 
a pure juridically inspired problem of  attribution for the 'historical 
explanation' of phenomena which are always only comprehensible 
individually (on Weber's  positive reference to Gustav Radbruch's 
concept of 'adequate causation' (1902) See Weber,  1985: 269ff.). 
The understanding of causality in the mechanistic world view was 
already an extrication of the causa efficiens  from a more encom- 
passing understanding of being, such as was still self-evident for 
Greek antiquity and the European Middle Ages.  The Aristotelian 
tradition that still prevailed in that era distinguished between four 
different  types of 'causes',  which were inwardly connected within 
underlying  teleological  world  view:  the  material,  the form,  the 
motive  force (causa efficiens)  and the end (telos). According to this 
thought, the originator (or the causa efficiens),  which is identical 
with the modern causal concept, was not the only presupposition 
for the 'being  of  that which has been created',  but rather  it  was 
embedded into the context of the structural totality shaped by an 
overarching concept of purpose (cf. Gadamer, 1967: 196f.). 
By  reaching back to interaction (Wechselwirkung) as the basic 
category for his thought  Simmel not only follows the relativistic 
world view of modern physics, but also consciously seeks to connect 
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with an older tradition of thought. The latter always conceived of 
itself as an alternative to the modern predominance of the causal 
category,  and  not  coincidentally,  it  rehabilitated  the  fourfold 
significance of the Aristotelian concept of 'cause'  in that respect. In 
the etymological respect, the concept of 'change'  ('Wechsel'  -  also 
meaning a draft, or promissory note) in the sense of the exchange 
of  goods is one of the oldest German commercial terms. In Kant's 
philosophy, the concept of 'interaction'  is explicitly equated with 
that of the community, and as an analogy of  experience it is deter- 
mined  according to the  principle of  the simultaneous being  of 
substances  in  space  (cf.  Kant,  1924: 302ff.).  In  the  Romantic 
philosophy of nature, the concept of interaction is called upon for 
describing an organism, in which the whole precedes the parts, so 
that the 'endless interactions' of the parts cannot be interpreted as 
a causal relationship, since any effect is always already the cause 
of its own attainment. 
Friedrich Schleiermacher finally attempted for the first time to 
make this idea of a fundamental simultaneity of the elements of an 
interaction fruitful in a genuinely social-philosophical form for his 
own philosophy in the context of his 'Theory  of  Social Behavior' 
(Theorie des geselligen Betragens) from 1799. As Part of this theory, 
he defined society as an 'interaction  winding through all its par- 
ticipants, but also completely determined and completed by  them' 
(Schleiermacher, 1984: 169; for the history of the concept 'interac- 
tion' see Christian,  1978: 1 lOff.). 
Simmel puts his own concept of 'interaction' into the theoretical 
context transmitted to him via Dilthey, by holding fast to the fun- 
damental boundlessness of  all events, by conceiving of these events 
constantly as connected by a variety of interactions, and by subjec- 
ting an analysis of these interactions to theprinciple of  simultaneity. 
This Preference for synchronism vis-a-vis diachronism distinguishes 
his approach fundamentally from a causal analysis in a Weberian 
sense, because the traditional concept of  causality is  necessarily 
dependent on the idea of a temporal succession in the sense of an 
afterwards (cf. Kant,  1924: 283ff.).  The interaction,  on the other 
hand implies a coexistence, which can be captured and described in 
the mode of  'magnifcent  simultaneity' (Friedrich Schlegel). 
This determination  of  Simmel's  fundamental principles has  a 
variety of implications and consequences for his method of  inter- 
preting, which can only be treated summarily and in passing within 
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description of  historical events 'as  they really happened' is fun- 
damentally not possible for epistemological  reasons. In that respect, 
historical understanding, like any kind of knowledge, is 'a transfer 
of that which directly exists into a new language' which 'follows only 
its own forms, categories and demands' (Simmel, 1905: 40ff.). Even 
the relationship between 'cause'and 'effect'is  substituted in that way 
by the logical  form of  a mutual relationship or an 'interaction',  in 
which 'the present has an effect on the past at the Same time as the 
past on the present' (Simmel, 1919: 191; cf. Christian,  1978: 125). 
Historical  understanding  according  to  this  view  designates  an 
intelligible level that is identical neither with the isolated acts of con- 
sciousness on the Part of the historian nor with the 'motives'  of 
'historical  individuals'. 
Second, even in any ordinary example of reciprocal action or 
interaction a play of projection and rejection between the acting and 
the experiencing individuals occurs. We always See the other only 
in the mirror of our own generalizations and typifications, and we 
gain our self  image conversely only through a 'generalized other' 
(cf. Simmel, 1968: 24ff.). 
Third, this 'global regulative principle'  in Simmel's 'method  of 
interpretation'  is  furthermore deeply connected with his cultural 
philosophy; adopted from the aesthetic worlis of Baudelaire, that 
described modernity as an eternal present.  In this  respect  then, 
Simmel's decision in favour of the category of interaction against 
that of causality owes something to the substantive results of his 
own analyses of  modern  and contemporary  culture  (cf.  Frisby, 
1981, 1985). 
In rejecting  all 'realistic'  or 'naturalistic'  reifications of  'ideal- 
typical' concept formations, Simmel was therefore no less rigorous 
than Max Weber. Unlike Weber, he additionally goes so far as to 
dissolve the 'external'  successions within  the empirical world  of 
phenomena into a simultaneity or timelessness of 'inner contempla- 
tion'.  Even so-called 'historical interpretation' is therefore only the 
expression of a logical process for Simmel, in which the difference 
between ego and non-ego, subject and object, as well as present and 
past is first constituted.  By  means of the example of his concept 
of historical interpretation, I will illustrate this commonality in the 
initial questioning between Simmel's attempt at an epistemological 
foundation of historical studies, on the one hand, and his quasi- 
transcendental  constitutional  theory  of  the  forms  of  sociation, 
on the other. Then I will attempt to characterize the status of the 
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sociological a prioris within Simmel's  attempt to ground modern 
sociology, and the latter's  logical relationship of that attempt to 
Weber's  Programme of an 'interpretive sociology'. 
IV 
Simmel starts from the fundamental circularity of human know- 
ledge, according to which external events can only be symbolically 
interpreted by analogy to 'inner experience',  and inner events con- 
versely only by  analogy to temporal-spatial,  i.e.  'external'  deter- 
minations. The two analogy formations do  not enjoy a relationship 
of mutual 'cause' and 'effect',  but occur simultaneously or produce 
one another mutually, and thus behave correlatively towards each 
other (Simmel, 1905: 20f.,  1922: 534ff., 1968: 567f.; cf. Lichtblau, 
1986: 64f.). This mode of  thesimultaneous characterizes in his view 
not only current actions and events, but also the historical inter- 
pretation of past events. The two types of understanding thus differ 
only in degree (cf.  Simmel,  1957: 44,  64).  Interpretation as such 
always contains a process of psychological reforming,  concentra- 
tion  and reshaping of  the 'acts  of  consciousness in others',  yet 
it  should  not  be  understood  as a  pure  'projection'.  Rather,  it 
designates a 'completely idiosyncratic synthesis of the category of 
the general with the simply individual',  which now takes the place 
of the causality of 'psycho-mechanical events' in describing those 
reasons which are based on the 'logical  relationships of their con- 
tents'  (Simmel,  1905: 30ff.).  Of  Course this form of  interpreting 
meaning also connects with the motives of the persons who are 
acting, but  it  subjects their analysis to the a priori demands of 
thought, through which the transmitted events are first formed into 
a historical context. The work of a historian, which Simmel did not 
compare to that of an artist by mere coincidence, concentrates the 
singular -  hence  also the 'subjective  motives'  insisted upon  by 
Weber -  into a structure of  meaning, which: 
often was  not present at all in the consciousness of its 'heroes',  by unearthing 
meanings and values in its material that shape this past into an image worthy of 
presenting to us. (Simmel,  1905: 41, 45ff.) 
With  respect  to what  was  really  experienced, the categories of 
history thus represent a priori categories of  the second order, as it 
were,  the analysis of  which  constitutes  the actual  object  of  an 
epistemology  of  'scholarly  history'  (Simmel,  1905: 50f.).  In this 50  Theory, Culture & Society 
sense, the difference between 'subjective'  and 'objective meaning' 
asserted  by  Weber  against  Simmel  is  consciously 'sublated'  in 
Simmel's  theoretical  analysis  of  the  constitution  of  historical 
thinking within the framework of a synthesis of the fantasy. For, 
according to him, a reconstruction of the possibility of historical 
interpreting moves on a logical level situated beyond this dualism. 
Nevertheless,  Simmel does take  up  the problem of  historical 
individuality  and  the  fundamental  issue  of  the  possibility  of 
understanding other minds as part of his a priori grounding of 
historical studies. The latter in particular were extensively discussed 
in his later works The Problem of Historical Time (Vom Problem 
der historischen Zeit) and On the Nature of Historical Understand- 
ing (Vom Wesen des historischen Verstehens) (for translations See 
Simmel, 1980). There, Simmel repeats his view that the prpcess of 
understanding as such constitubes something completely timeless, 
and cannot therefore be described in the form of  a causal rela- 
tionship. For him,  'historical'  is the epitome of  an event that is 
unambiguously determined ifl  its date, and thus is accorded the 
'character of individualization',  which results solely from its posi- 
tion within the context of meaning reconstructed by the historian. 
Simmel, however, denies the character of the temporal to that con- 
text, because any time-span conceived in that way js  subject to the 
law of causality. The historical concept of duration, on the other 
hand, expresses a unity of understanding whose individual elements 
determine each other correlatively, i.e.  in a hermeneutically con- 
ceived mode of mutual 'interaction' (cf. Simmel, 1957: 44ff., 71ff.). 
What  is  fundamental for Simmel's  theory of  historical under- 
standing, then, is not the difference between cause and effect, or 
between subjective and objective meaning, but that between 'I'  and 
'You'  in the sense of the constitutive 'relationship of one Spirit to 
another'. This relationship alreadyfinds a 'fragmentary outline' of 
itself  in  the practice of  the lifeworld, and is to be  analysed by 
epistemology solely  with  respect  to its  a  priori  premises.  The 
categories of You and understanding prove identical in this process; 
in them, the condition humaine is 'expressed once as a substance, 
as it were and once as a function -  an elemental phenomenon of 
the human mind . . .  it is the transcendental foundation for the fact 
that the human being  is  a Zoon politikon'.  Those categories are 
therefore 'about as decisive for the construction of the practical and 
historical world as are the categories of substance and causality for 
the physical world' (Simmel,  1957: 67f.). 
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In the introductory chapter of his Iarge Soziologie (1968) from 
1908,  Simmel attempted to make this  transcendental nature of 
understanding and the implicit fundamental conceptuai difference 
between 'I' and 'You'  fruitful for an a priori foundation of the sociai 
sciences. In this way he hoped to be able to provide a definitive 
answer to the question Othmar Spann had still raised against his 
'formal method', of how society can be possible at all as an objective 
form  of subjective souls (cf. Simmel, 1968: 21ff.).  Animated by a 
corresponding attempt by Max Adler (1904), Simmel now made an 
effort to show that an a priori design occurs in the most varied forms 
of  social interaction which  always places the contents of  these 
interactions, that is, 'drives',  'motives',  subjective 'experiences',  and 
'purposes',  into a context of  sociation. These concrete 'contents' 
come under consideration in Simmel's  sociological approach only 
in  the  sense  that  they  have  already  entered  into  this  quasi- 
transcendental shaping; that is to say, they have been synthesized 
or sociated to an extent by a corresponding social a priori. A fun- 
damental conceptual difference between the 'subjectively intended' 
and the 'objectively valid meaning' has thus in fact become irrele- 
vant not only for Simmel's metatheory of history, but also for his 
sociological analyses of the various forms of social 'interaction' - 
and Max  Weber rightly emphasized this. The only difference, or 
better, the 'original difference' that therefore still plays a Part in 
Simmel's a priori formal foundation of sociology, is the difference 
between  'I'  and  'You'  built  into the act of  interpretation  itself, 
which as a primevalphenomenon lies beyond the conflict between 
'subjective'  and 'objective.* 
As  compared to Weber's  approach  in  this  respect,  Simmel's 
analysis of the sociological a prioris contains a completely auto- 
nomous theory of interpretation which was taken up quite produc- 
tively not only by his Student Martin Buber, but also by the6Chicago 
School of  sociology',  and  became  fruitful for a  dialogic social 
philosophy or an interpretive sociology. In the variant of an inter- 
pretive sociology that Max Weber represents, by  contrast,  he  no 
longer discusses the act of 'interpreting' as reconstructed by Simmel 
and his successors. Instead, he presumes the possibility of inter- 
pretation as if  'selfevident',  in order to functionalize it for his real 
cognitive interest -  that of 'causal  explanation'.' 
Simmel,  by  contrast, would  like to show two things with his 
analysis of  the a  priori  preconditions of  interpretation  and the 
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possible reference points of a sociological causal analysis, that is, 
both the 'social  actors' and the 'social  constructs', are to be con- 
ceived of as the results of simultaneously occurring interactions, 
which  alone constitute  them  as relative interaction  units at all. 
Simmel had developed and presented this train of thought already 
back  in  1890 as part  of  his  attempt  to overcome 'speculative 
atomism'  with  the  epistemological  means  of  that  very  Same 
'atomism'.  On the other hand, the 'original phenomenon' of inter- 
pretation itself is explicated as the specijlc form  of an ihteraction, 
by means of which the 'subjects'  of interpretation and the possible 
'points of attribution' of a causal analysis are first hermeneutically 
constituted, as it were. 
Simmel  expresses this  line of  thought  most  succinctly in  his 
discussion of the 'first sociological a priori'.  There he alludes to the 
thought he had already asserted in his epistemology of history, that 
we can always interpret 'external' events symbolically only accord- 
ing  to 'inner'  analogies and vice  versa,  and  that  both  of  these 
analogy formations are performed in the mode of the simultaneous, 
that is to say, in the form of a hermeneutic circle or of an interac- 
tion.  In  this  connection,  Simmel says that  we  can  never  grasp 
another Person in his full individuality or uniqueness, but instead 
always create a more or less general image of him, or typify him, 
since a real knowledge of him would presume an equality of subject 
and object,  or of  ego and non-ego that never  exists in  reality. 
Conversely -  and in this view Simmel follows not only the Poet but 
also the neurologist -  we ourselves are only: 
fragments  not just of the general human being, but also of ourselves. . . .  This 
fragmentary quality, however, completes the view of the other into something . 
that  we  ourselves never  are purely  and  completely. He  cannot  See  only the 
fragments lying next to one another that really exist, but just as we supplement 
the blind spot in our field of vision, so that one is not even aware of it, similarly 
we make of this fragmentary data the completeness of his individuality. . . .  This 
fundamental procedure, although it is seldom carried out to perfection in reality 
now takes effect within the already existing society as the a priori of the further 
interactions that unfold between individuals. .  . . Certain suppositions emerge 
from the common basis of life, through which people catch sight of each other, 
as if through a veil. (Simmel,  1968: 281f.) 
But it is precisely this veil, however, which Simmel invokes with 
its indirect allusion to Plato's famous metaphor for the eyes, which 
is at the Same time what makes 'society'  in the sense described by 
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Simmel possible at all. For the pure immediacy and simultaneity of 
understanding oneself and others represents a logical limiting case, 
which may of Course be possible as a mystical 'experience' or in the 
gazes of lovers as a language of the eyes, but which is completely 
irrelevant to those everyday interactions that constitute the central 
forms of  s~ciation.~  In this connection,  Simmel also frequently 
uses the metaphor of detours in order to indicate that we can neither 
conceive and  know  ourselves nor  understand  the  other  in  his 
immediacy through pure  self-referentiality, because that is both 
near to and far from  us. These detours and 'deviations'  from the 
immediacy of self-relationship and of an understanding of others 
are  also  what  constitute  the  actual  object  of  Simmel's  formal 
sociology as well  as of  his  cultural theory  as  sketched  out  in 
The Philosophy of Money. In this context,  he occupied himself 
particularly with those 'detours'  which the individual must put up 
with in pursuing his subjective purposes and valuations, in order to 
attain his actual 'final goals'.  The extent of such detours indicates 
the degree of social differentiation in each case, the increase of 
which Simmel generally evaluated as cultural Progress. He com- 
pared these increasing 'distances' to taxes which the individual had 
to pay to 'society' in order to pursue his own motives and purposes 
(cf.  Simmel,  1890: 42ff,  1922: 480ff.).'  Precisely these  'detours', 
'distances'  and forms  which  shape individual  action  acquire  a 
specific socializing  or sociating function  that  can  be  described 
according to Simmel as a  completely  new  and genuinely  auto- 
nomous nems of meaning, without any 'causal attribution' to sub- 
jective  'motives'  being  required  for the understanding  of  these 
'immeasurable  contexts'.  The  real  place  where,  according  to 
Simmel, individuality in a qualitative sense can still unfold in the 
culture of modernity is less the sphere of the 'social'  than that of 
artistic, erotic and religious 'experience',  in which the 'modern soul' 
is  able  to preserve  and  build  up  its  particularity  (cf.  Simmel, 
1922: 529ff.; Lichtblau,  1988: 54ff., 89ff.). 
V 
In concluding, we still must discuss Weber's charge that in Simmel's 
works 'problems of being' are often treated as 'problems of mean- 
ing',  and that  the  latter  thereby  give  expression not  only  to a 
metaphysical but also to an aesthetic need. Now  Simmel himself 
repeatedly pointed out that every 'exact'  specialized science pos- 
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the one hand, the epistemology of a specialized science based on a 
priori assumptions and, on the other, a corresponding metaphysics. 
In the case of history an attempt is made to satisfy this 'metaphysical 
need' with the philosophy of history, while the Same is done in the 
case of 'pure' or 'formal' sociology with 'philosophical sociology' or 
socialphilosophy (cf. Simmel, 1892: 71ff., 1905: 1  12ff., 1922: V-ix, 
1968: 20f.,  1970: 29ff.). 
Within such a metaphysics beyond exact science, Simmel actually 
does attempt to provide an answer to the question of the meaning 
of life and the inner contents of the underlying 'ultimate'  values. 
According to Simmel, the basis for the legitimacy of such an enquiry 
is  that  the  'empirical'  (wirklichkeitswissenschaftlich)  approach 
necessarily loses sight of the totality of life, because it breaks con- 
crete events and the sum of their interactions down into a number 
of fragments. Unlike Marx and the 'universalist' stance of Othmar 
Spann, Simmel has long since abandoned the hope that this lost 
totality of life could be reconstructed by  means of a specialized 
science.  His own sociological analyses are thus consciously 'con- 
ceived as examples in their methods and, in their content, only as 
fragments of what I must consider the science of society' (Simmel, 
1968: 14). 
He attempts a philosophical clarification of the value of sociation 
for the further  development of  individuals, and he  has a meta- 
physical need for the unity of an overall view, which would con- 
dense the abbreviation of phenomena in a purely symbolic manner. 
The attempt is owed to that deep 'dissatisfaction with the fragmen- 
tary  character  of  detailed  knowledge'  which  later  logically  led 
him away from  sociology in favour of a more intensive concern 
with the fundamental probiems of metaphysics, aesthetics and the 
philosophy of religion and life. To reproach him for this is not only 
improper but also inadequate,  because Simmel always indicated 
precisely where his respective works are logically situated  within 
and beyond the mode of knowing characteristic of a specialized 
discipline. 
Here Simmel's  Philosophy of Money assumes an outstanding 
importance for his cultural-philosophical and metaphysical inter- 
pretation of the  fragments of modernity. He had characterized that 
work's  logical position clearly enough within and beyond the range 
of  validity of  a scientifcally  organized economics.  Reproaching 
him in this context for not differentiating clearly enough between 
'determinations of fact' and 'valuations'  is like carrying coals to 
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Newcastle. For Simmel had always said unambiguously that he was 
concerned in his Philosophy of Money with tracing the primeval 
phenomena of value as such. Therefore he was also engaged in a 
clarification of the premises which determine the nature of money 
and meaning of its existente on the one hand, and at the Same time 
with a presentation of its effects on the 'inner  world',  i.e.  on the 
vital consciousness (Lebensgefühl)  of individuals, on the concatena- 
tion  of  their fates  and  on the  development  of  general  culture 
(cf. Simmel, 1922: viff., Frisby, 1978; Lichtblau, 1986, 1988: 37ff.). 
Thus, Simmel consciously conceived of his 'philosophy of money' 
simultaneously as an aesthetic theory, and incidentally also deter- 
mined his concept of social formation by analogy to the aesthetic 
concept of form (cf. Davis, 1973; Hübner-Funk, 1976,1984; Ritter, 
1976; Böhringer, 1984; Boella,  1986; Frisby,  1989). 
Similarly to a  'self-contained'  work of  art, the objectivity of 
values crystallized and symbolized in money appeared to him as a 
social construct which has consumed the motions of its becoming 
within itselfand has become 'indifferent' to them when understood 
according to those purely  immanent determinations (cf. Simmel, 
1957: 73).  And  like the consideration of  art, the 'philosophy of 
money'  also proceeds from an apparently purely peripheral indi- 
vidual example, in order to 'do justice to it through its expansion 
and extension to the totality and the most general case'.  In the sense 
that 'its entire practical meaning lies not in itself but only in its con- 
version into other values',  money thus becomes pure indifference, 
the most general expression and the symbol of a culture in which 
things and people have lost their autonomy and now determine their 
relative value mutualh (Simmel,  1922: viii, gaff., 584f.). 
Max Weber attempted to judge Simmel's work according to a 
Standard which is simply inappropriate to the uniqueness of  this 
Oeuvre. It is a different question, however, whether Weber himself 
stringently adhered in his own research work to the methodological 
postulates summarized in his 'theory of science'.  Doubts as to the 
'freedom from value judgments' of his historical analyses arise, for 
instance, when Weber constructs a heroic age of modern capitaiism 
in order to emphasize the decadent and derivative character of the 
contemporary  culture  surrounding  him  (cf.  Weber,  1920: 20f., 
55f., 203f., 1985: 139). Doubts also come up when he describes the 
overall Course of the occidental rationalization process over against 
the  'organically  prescribed circulation  of  life'  as an  ever more 
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likewise in order as to whether Weber actuaily maintained the dif- 
ference he postulated between ideal and real  types strictly in his 
material sociology, or whether he is not describing something like 
a realization of values here, that is, a crystailization  of the subjective 
"value relationships' into objective 'contexts of meaning' or objective 
constmcts (cf. Mannheim, 1929: 239ff.;  Habermas,  1981 :  I, 263; 
Levine,  1984: 333ff.;  Bevers,  1985: 132ff.). 
Finally, one must also be dubious with respect to his postulate 
that neither symbol-rich illustrations nor analogy formations nor 
quasi-aesthetic categories may be employed in 'historical cultural 
sciences'. For Weber repeatedly employed a meaning-laden literary 
topos in order, for instance to characterize a central methodological 
problem of his study of Protestantism: the metaphor of elective 
affinities. With  his  novel  of the Same title  Goethe intended to 
create a  chemical allegory  which  he  based  on the  c&stellation 
of Ottilie, Eduard, Charlotte and the Captain. The neologism 'elec- 
tive affinities' therefore  denotes in  this context a  constraint of 
natural law, so to speak, or a magical attractive power  of  love 
which threatens to destroy the moral and legal foundations of the 
bourgeois institution of marriage. 
Weber  criticized Simmel not  only  for  basing his  works on  a 
'sociologically  amorphous'  concept of  interaction, but  also  for 
making use of the 'problematic',  'aesthetically charged' methods of 
analogy formation and symbolic interpretation of the 'correlations' 
between 'inner'  and 'outer',  or 'psychic'  and  'social'  facts in  the 
Philosophy  of  Money  and  his  sociological  writings.  Now,  in 
order to characterize an aporia not soluble causally ('magnificent 
simultaneity'),  Weber  himself  repeatedly makes use of  a literary 
topos that has been  decoded in Germanist studies as a mythical 
mode of thought ever since Walter  Benjamin's  ground-breaking 
study of Goethe's  Elective Affinities (cf. Benjamin,  1980: 123ff.; 
Buschendorf, 1986). 1s it perhaps a coincidence that this 'mythical 
shadow play', which Weber was able to make metaphorically fruit- 
ful  for  research  into  the  cultural  history  of  ascetic  capitalism 
and the genesis of the modern professional ethos, is additionally 
oriented toward the model case of a collapsing marriage? By  the 
way, Talcott Parsons elegantly '~olved'  or better, evaded this symp- 
tomatically overdetermined problem by translating Wahlverwand- 
schaften as 'correlations' rather than the more accurate 'elective 
affinities', thus favouring an expression more closely connected to 
Simmel's than Weber's terminology (cf. Weber, 1976: 90). 1s this not 
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.  perhaps also a symptomatic shift within his own 'discourse of the 
:  other'? 
- Translated by Mark Ritter. 
3 
Notes 
I.  Simmel first systematically developed his theory of social differentiation in the 
work of the same name from 1890, and later based both his Philosophy of Money 
as well as the 'large'  Soziologie (1x8) of  1908 on it (see Lichtblau, 1984). 
2.  For the sake af clarity, I have taken the liberty of quoting from a scarcely legible 
reproduction (due to multiple copying) of the German-language original manuscript. 
This has been  circulating 'unofficially'  in the scholarly world  for years,  and was 
kindly provided to me by a colleague. The original, currently held in the Max Weber 
Depository at the Bavarian State Library in Munich under the call number 'Ana 446'. 
will soon be published in the Max- Weber-Gesamtausgabe. 
3.  The problematic nature of this positive reference to Spann's critique of Simmel 
lies of Course, in the fact that Weber's own 'methodological individualism' was later 
likewise harshly criticized by Spann's 'universalism' (cf. Spann, 1923a. 1925: 149-67; 
on  Weber's  later  dissociation  from  Spann's  'universalistic  method'  cf.  Weber. 
1985: 557f.). 
4.  Here 1 consciously emphasizethe fundamental conceptual 'elective  affinity' 
between Simmel's approach and the difference-theoretical deconstruction of classical 
metaphysics by  Gilles Deleuze (1968) and with Jacques Derrida's  meditations on 
'diffkrance' (1%8,  1974: 44ff.).  Here one is concerned with the Same model based 
on a constitutional logic of an origin of all differences from an original differente 
which as such can no longer be derived from anything else. Such a model also plays 
an important  part  in  Heidegger's  thought  and  has  recently  been  injected  into 
sociological  discussions  by  Niklas  Luhmann.  On  the  corresponding  'elective 
affinities' between Luhmann's autopoietic Systems theory and French structuralism 
as inspired  by  Ferdinand  de Saussure's  foundation  of  modern  linguistics,  see 
Lichtblau,  1980: 249ff. 
5.  Therefore, the idea that Simmel's 'sociological method'  in the sense described 
above,  and  not  Weber's  'methodological  individualism'  was  the  most  suitable 
starting-point for the development  of a genuinely 'interpretive  sociology' was the 
unanimous  opinion  that  connected  the  participants  in  a  discussion  of  Werner 
Sombart's paper on 'Interpretation' (Das Verstehen) at the Sixth Congress of German 
Sociologists  in  Zürich,  bearing  in  mind  the  other  differences  expressed  there 
(cf. Sombart, 1929). Considering this, one of the most interesting questions in the 
framework of a sociological analysis of the recent history of sociology is the problem 
of why after 1945 it was Weber's work and not that of Simmel which was hypostatized 
as the real origin of the tradition of an interpretive sociology. 
6.  On the significance of a specific language of  the eyes in this sense, cf. the 
lucid  analysis  in  Simmel's  'Sociology  of  the  Senses'  [Soziologie  der  Sinne] 
(1968: 484ff.). 
7.  On the significance of  the expression  'pathos  of  distance'  which occurs in 
Simmel's  works  and  its 'elective  affinity'  to Nietzsche's  critique of  culture,  cf. 
Lichtblau,  1984. 58  Theory, Culture & Society 
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